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Autobiographical memory, future thinking, and spatial navigation are critical cognitive functions that are
thought to be related and are known to depend upon a brain structure called the hippocampus.
Surprisingly, direct evidence for their interrelatedness is lacking, as is an understanding of why they
might be related. There is debate about whether they are linked by an underlying memory-related process
or, as has more recently been suggested, because they each require the endogenous construction of scene
imagery. Here, using a large sample of participants and multiple cognitive tests with a wide spread of
individual differences in performance, we found that these functions are indeed related. Mediation
analyses further showed that scene construction, and not memory, mediated (explained) the relationships
between the functions. These findings offer a fresh perspective on autobiographical memory, future
thinking, navigation, and also on the hippocampus, where scene imagery appears to play an influential
role.
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Our past experiences are captured in autobiographical memories
that serve to sustain our sense of self, enable independent living,
and prolong survival (Tulving, 2002). Consequently, a key aim of
cognitive psychology and neuropsychology has been to understand
how such memories are formed and recollected. There is wide
agreement that a brain structure called the hippocampus plays a
key role in supporting autobiographical memories. Patients with
hippocampal damage are impaired at recalling past experiences
(Scoville & Milner, 1957; see also Clark & Maguire, 2016; Ver-
faellie & Keane, 2017; Winocur & Moscovitch, 2011), and the
hippocampus is consistently engaged during functional MRI stud-
ies of autobiographical memory retrieval (Cabeza & St. Jacques,
2007; Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006). Consequently, the
hippocampus and autobiographical memory have become synon-
ymous.
However, the hippocampus has been associated with functions
beyond autobiographical memory. The animal literature has, for
many years, placed spatial navigation at the heart of hippocampal
processing (Moser, Kropff, & Moser, 2008; O’Keefe &
Dostrovsky, 1971; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978), with concordant
findings in humans (Ekstrom et al., 2003; Epstein, Patai, Julian, &
Spiers, 2017; Maguire et al., 2000). Work over the past decade has
also linked the hippocampus with thinking about the future (Addis,
Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire,
2007), the imagination of scenes and events (Hassabis, Kumaran,
Vann, et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2012), the perception of scenes
(Graham, Barense, & Lee, 2010; McCormick, Rosenthal, Miller,
& Maguire, 2017), and specific aspects of visuospatial processing,
including perceptual richness, a sense of reliving and imagery
content (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner,
2010; St-Laurent, Moscovitch, & McAndrews, 2016; St. Jacques,
Conway, Lowder, & Cabeza, 2010).
The link between autobiographical memory, the construction of
scene imagery in the imagination (scene construction), and think-
ing about the future has come under increasing scrutiny. Studies of
amnesic patients have reported deficits in tasks assessing each of
these functions (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007; Klein,
Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Tulving,
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1985). In neuroimaging studies, the recruitment of the same neural
network, including the hippocampus, has been observed when
thinking about the past, the future, or atemporal events and scenes
with no obvious focus in time (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis
& Maguire, 2007; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). In addition,
comparisons of behavioral measures have highlighted similarities
in terms of ratings of vividness and the amount and type of details
for past, future, and atemporal events (D’Argembeau & Van der
Linden, 2006; de Vito, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2012). Overall,
therefore, autobiographical memory, scene construction, and
thinking about the future seem to involve the hippocampus, with
parallels also in the pattern of behavioral outcomes. Yet, concep-
tually, they are different processes not least in terms of the tem-
poral context within which the scene or event is imagined. The
question, therefore, arises as to what does the hippocampus do in
the service of each of these functions?
One suggestion is that autobiographical memory provides the
building blocks for thinking about the future and imagining atem-
poral scenes and events and, as such, their dependence on the
hippocampus is fundamentally mnemonic (Moscovitch, Cabeza,
Winocur, & Nadel, 2016; Schacter et al., 2012; Sheldon & Levine,
2016). This is based upon the suggestion that autobiographical
memory recall is a constructive process that recombines different
elements to recreate memories (e.g., Schacter et al., 2012). This
information is also available for the construction of nonautobio-
graphical memory events. In this regard, the autobiographical
memory system is equally well equipped to imagine future or
atemporal events as well as recalling the past (see also St. Jacques,
Carpenter, Szpunar, & Schacter, 2018; Thakral, Benoit, &
Schacter, 2017).
An alternative view is that the mental construction of scene
imagery is a key process that autobiographical memory, future
thinking, and spatial navigation have in common (Maguire &
Mullally, 2013; see also Robin, 2018, and Rubin & Umanath,
2015, for related theoretical viewpoints). A scene is a naturalistic
three-dimensional spatially coherent representation of the world
typically populated by objects and viewed from an egocentric
perspective. When most people recall the past, imagine the future
or plan a route during navigation, scenes feature prominently. An
individual’s ability to use scene imagery, or spatial context, to
imagine or recall an event, has been shown to predict the vividness
and detail of the imagined scenario (Arnold, McDermott, & Sz-
punar, 2011; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Hebscher,
Levine, & Gilboa, 2017; Robin & Moscovitch, 2014; Robin,
Wynn, & Moscovitch, 2016; Sheldon & Chu, 2017; Szpunar &
McDermott, 2008). Furthermore, damage limited to the hippocam-
pus is known to impede the ability to construct endogenous scene
imagery (Andelman, Hoofien, Goldberg, Aizenstein, & Neufeld,
2010; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007; Maguire & Mullally,
2013; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011; Rosenbaum, Gilboa,
Levine, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2009). The mental construction
of scenes is, therefore, both reliant upon hippocampal functionality
and related to autobiographical memory, future thinking, and spa-
tial navigation.
There is, however, a dearth of evidence available that permits
adjudication between a mnemonic or scene construction account of
hippocampal function. Arguably, extant evidence highlights the
importance of scene construction over autobiographical memory
(de Vito et al., 2012; Palombo, Hayes, Peterson, Keane, & Verfa-
ellie, 2018; Robin & Moscovitch, 2014; but see also, Addis,
Cheng, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011; Roberts, Schacter, & Addis,
2017). To the best of our knowledge, there are no large-scale
individual differences studies systematically examining the direct
relationships between scene construction, autobiographical mem-
ory, thinking about the future and spatial navigation.
We, therefore, had two overarching goals in the current study.
First, we sought to investigate whether scores on tasks assessing
scene construction, autobiographical memory, future thinking, and
spatial navigation were related. Second, if they were related, we
wished to unpack these relationships further by attempting to
pinpoint whether the link between them could be best explained by
either a scene construction or an autobiographical memory pro-
cess. Given that the scene construction deficit of hippocampal-
damaged patients is evident even on nonmnemonic tasks, for
example, the visual perception of scenes (Lee et al., 2005; Mc-
Cormick et al., 2017), we hypothesized that the relationship, if any,
between the tasks would be best explained by scene construction
rather than by autobiographical memory.
To address our first goal, we conducted a principal component
analysis (PCA) involving a large range of cognitive tests. This
allowed us to assess whether or not performance on tasks exam-
ining scene construction, autobiographical memory, future think-
ing, and navigation was related in the presence of other cognitive
tasks.
To pursue our second goal, we performed a series of mediation
analyses. This approach allowed us to investigate how scores on
the tasks of interest were related. Mediation analyses focus on
whether one variable can explain (mediate) the relationship be-
tween two different variables. In short, we expected that if the
cognitive process linking the different tasks together was related to
scenes, then scene construction performance would mediate the
task relationships. By contrast, if the underlying process was
related to autobiographical memory, then autobiographical mem-
ory performance would be found to mediate.
We recruited a large group of participants and assessed their
performance on a comprehensive battery of cognitive tasks, in-
cluding measures of scene construction, autobiographical memory,
future thinking, and navigation. Tasks were chosen from the pub-
lished literature because of their confirmed reliance (or nonreli-
ance) upon the hippocampus.
Method
Participants
Two hundred and seventeen individuals were recruited. They
were aged between 20 and 41 years old, had English as their first
language and reported no psychological, psychiatric, neurological,
or behavioral health conditions. The age range was restricted to
20–41 to limit the possible effects of ageing. Participants report-
ing hobbies or vocations known to be associated with the hip-
pocampus (e.g., licensed London taxi drivers) were excluded. The
mean age of the sample was 29.0 years (95% confidence interval
[CI]: 20, 38) and included 109 women and 108 men. Participants
were reimbursed £10 per hour for taking part which was paid at
study completion. All participants gave written informed consent
and the study was approved by the University College London
Research Ethics Committee. American Psychological Association
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ethical standards were complied with in regards to the treatment of
the participants.
The sample size was determined at 216 during study design to
be robust to employing different statistical approaches when an-
swering multiple questions of interest. Specifically, the sample
allows for sufficient power to identify medium effect sizes when
conducting regression analyses, which form the basis of mediation
analyses, at alpha levels of .01 (Cohen, 1992). Importantly, the
sample size is also large enough to conduct mediation analyses and
structural equation modeling (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). A final
sample of 217 was obtained due to over recruitment.
Procedure
Participants completed the study over three separate visits. The
order of tests within each visit was the same for all participants
(see the Task Order section). Task order was arranged so as to
avoid task interference, for example, not having a verbal test
followed by another verbal test, and to provide sessions of approx-
imately equal length (3–3.5 hr, including breaks). All partici-
pants completed all parts of the study.
Cognitive Tests
Measures of primary interest. Our main interest was in
scene construction, autobiographical memory, future thinking, and
navigation; tasks that are known to recruit or require the hip-
pocampus to be successfully completed. All tasks are published
and were performed and scored as per their published use. Given
the extensive task battery that was used, only the main outcome
measure was used for each task to reduce potential issues sur-
rounding multiple comparisons and false positives. Here, for the
reader’s convenience, we describe each task briefly.
Scene construction test. The scene construction test (Hassa-
bis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007) measures a participant’s ability
to mentally construct a visual scene. Participants construct differ-
ent scenes of commonplace settings. For each scene, a short cue is
provided (e.g., imagine lying on a beach in a beautiful tropical bay)
and the participant is asked to imagine the scene that is evoked and
then describe it out loud in as much detail as possible. Recordings
are transcribed for later scoring. Participants are explicitly told not
to describe a memory, but to create a new scene that they have
never experienced before.
The overall outcome measure is an “experiential index” that is
calculated for each scene and then averaged. In brief, it is com-
posed of four elements: the content, participant ratings of their
sense of presence (how much they felt like they were really there)
and perceived vividness, participant ratings of the spatial coher-
ence of the scene, and an experimenter rating of the overall quality
of the scene.
Double scoring was performed on 20% of the data. We took the
most stringent approach to identifying across-experimenter agree-
ment. Interclass correlation coefficients, with a two-way random
effects model looking for absolute agreement indicated excellent
agreement among the experimenter ratings (minimum score of .9;
see Supplemental Table S1 in the online supplementary materials).
For reference, a score of .8 or above is considered excellent
agreement beyond chance.
Autobiographical interview. In the autobiographical inter-
view (AI; Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002)
participants are asked to provide autobiographical memories from
a specific time and place over four time periods—early childhood
(up to age 11), teenage years (aged from 11–17), adulthood (from
age 18 years to 12 months prior to the interview; two memories are
requested), and the last year (a memory from the last 12 months).
Recordings are transcribed for later scoring.
In contrast to the other tasks, the AI has two main outcome
measures, both of which are consistently reported in the literature.
Memories are scored to collect “internal” and “external” details of
the event. Importantly, these two scores represent different aspects
of autobiographical memory recall. Internal details are those de-
scribing the event in question (i.e., episodic details). External
details describe semantic information concerning the event, or
nonevent information. Internal events are therefore thought to be
hippocampal-dependent, while external events are not. As such, in
line with the published literature, we report both outcome mea-
sures. The two AI scores are obtained by separately averaging
performance for the internal and external details across five auto-
biographical memories. Our double scoring produced excellent
agreement across the experimenters (minimum score of .81; see
Supplemental Table S2 in the online supplementary materials).
Future thinking test (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al., 2007).
This test follows the same procedure as the scene construction test
but requires participants to imagine three plausible future scenes
involving themselves (an event at the weekend; next Christmas;
the next time they will meet a friend). Participants are explicitly
told not to describe a memory, but to create a new future scene.
Recordings are transcribed for later scoring. The scoring proce-
dures are the same as for scene construction. Double scoring
identified excellent agreement across the experimenters (minimum
score of .88; see Supplemental Table S3 in the online supplemen-
tary materials).
Navigation tests (Woollett & Maguire, 2010). Navigation
ability is assessed using movies of navigation through an unfamil-
iar town. Movie clips of two overlapping routes through this real
town (Blackrock, in Dublin, Ireland) are shown to participants four
times.
Five tasks are used to assess navigational ability. First, follow-
ing each viewing of the route movies, participants are shown four
short clips—two from the actual routes, and two distractors. Par-
ticipants indicate whether they have seen each clip or not. Second,
after all four route viewings are completed, recognition memory
for scenes from the routes is tested. A third test involves assessing
knowledge of the spatial relationships between landmarks from the
routes. Fourth, route knowledge is examined by having partici-
pants place photographs from the routes in the correct order as if
traveling through the town. Finally, participants draw a sketch map
of the two routes including as many landmarks as they can re-
member. Sketch maps are scored in terms of the number of road
segments, road junctions, correct landmarks, landmark positions,
the orientation of the routes and an overall map quality score from
the experimenters. Double scoring was performed on 20% of the
sketch maps finding excellent agreement (minimum of .89; see
Supplemental Table S4 in the online supplementary materials). An
overall navigation score is calculated by combining scores from all
of the above tasks.
Additional measures. We administered a range of other tasks
to participants which enabled us to further profile their cognition.
In brief, estimates of IQ were obtained using the Test of Premorbid
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Functioning (TOPF; Wechsler, 2011). The number of correct
responses was converted to an estimate of Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) as
per the TOPF scoring procedure. General intellect and executive
functioning were measured using the Matrix Reasoning subtest of
the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV (Wechsler, 2008), the
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and
the F-A-S verbal fluency task (F-A-S; Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen,
2006). Working memory/attention was assessed using the Digit
Span subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale IV and the
Symbol Span subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale IV
(Wechsler, 2009).
Visuospatial recall was examined using the Rey–Osterrieth
Complex Figure (ROCF; Rey, 1941). In addition, we also used an
object-place association test which required participants to learn
the locations of 16 objects presented simultaneously on a white
computer screen (adapted from Woollett & Maguire, 2009). The
outcome measure was the number of trials (maximum of 6) taken
to correctly learn the location of all the objects, with a score of
seven if the array was never learnt (this was reverse scored for ease
of interpretation with the other tasks).
Verbal recall was assessed using the Rey Auditory Verbal
Learning Test (RAVLT; see Strauss et al., 2006), and the Logical
Memory and Verbal Paired Associates subtests of the Wechsler
Memory Scale IV (Wechsler, 2009). Two additional verbal recall
tasks were also included (Clark, Kim, & Maguire, 2018). A lim-
itation of the Wechsler Memory Scale Verbal Paired Associates
task is its reliance on concrete, imageable words (Clark & Magu-
ire, 2016; Maguire & Mullally, 2013). We therefore included two
additional versions of this task. In one case, only concrete, image-
able words are used, whereas the other comprises only abstract,
nonimageable words. The two tests are precisely matched apart
from the imageability of the words. For all of these recall tasks, the
delayed recall scores were used as our primary data as they are
most sensitive to hippocampal damage (Squire, 1992).
Recognition memory was assessed using the Warrington Rec-
ognition Memory Tests for words, faces, and scenes (Cipolotti &
Maguire, 2003; Warrington, 1984). Semantic memory was as-
sessed using the “Dead or Alive” task which probes general
knowledge about whether famous individuals have died or are still
alive (Kapur, Young, Bateman, & Kennedy, 1989).
General visuospatial processing was assessed using the Paper
Folding Test (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976), which
measures a participant’s ability to transform images of spatial
patterns into different arrangements. Perceptual processing was
assessed using scene description and boundary extension tasks
(Mullally, Intraub, & Maguire, 2012). The scene description task
requires participants to describe a picture of a scene. The content
of participants’ descriptions is scored across a number of catego-
ries and summed to provide a total content score. Double scoring
was performed on 20% of the descriptions finding excellent agree-
ment (minimum of .85; see Supplemental Table S5 in the online
supplementary materials). Boundary extension occurs when indi-
viduals who are viewing scenes automatically imagine what might
be beyond the view, and consequently later misremember having
seen a greater expanse of the scene (Intraub & Richardson, 1989).
To test this, participants are briefly presented on each trial with
two pictures in rapid succession and are asked to rate whether the
second picture is of a closer perspective (when boundary extension
is induced), exactly the same (the correct answer), or further away.
Unbeknownst to participants, the majority of images are exactly
the same. The outcome measure was the proportion of same trials
classed as closer-up.
Task order. The tests were conducted in the following order:
In Session 1, Concrete Verbal Paired Associates (learning), War-
rington Recognition Memory Test for scenes, Dead or Alive Task,
Symbol Span Test, Scene Description Task, Concrete Verbal
Paired Associates (delayed recall), Logical Memory test (learn-
ing), ROCF (copy), TOPF, Warrington Recognition Memory Test
for faces, Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test, Logical Memory test
(delayed recall), ROCF (delayed recall), and Warrington Recog-
nition Memory Test for words. In Session 2, navigation tests,
followed by Abstract Verbal Paired Associates (learning, with
delayed recall 30 min later). In Session 3, Scene Construction Test,
Future Thinking Test, RAVLT (learning), Paper Folding Test,
Digit Span Test, Matrix Reasoning, RAVLT (delayed recall),
Autobiographical Interview, Wechsler Memory Scale Verbal
Paired Associates (learning), object-place association test, bound-
ary extension task, Wechsler Memory Scale Verbal Paired Asso-
ciates (delayed recall), and F-A-S task.
Statistical Analyses
Data are summarized using means and 95% CIs, calculated in
SPSS v22. PCA was performed using SPSS v22, with varimax
rotation and a cut-off at an eigenvalue of 1. Regression analyses
with standardized beta values and confidence intervals were per-
formed in R v3.4. Mediation and sensitivity analyses were per-
formed using the R Causal Mediation Analysis package v4.4.6
(Imai, Keele, & Tingley, 2010). Structural equation modeling
(SEM) was performed using the R Lavaan package v0.6–1.1178
(Rosseel, 2012) and assessed for model fit as per the criteria of Hu
and Bentler (1999). Effect sizes are reported as R2 values for
regressions, including those regressions used in the mediation and
SEM analyses (adjusted R2 when multiple variables were in-
cluded) and as sensitivity analyses for the mediation analyses.
There were no missing data, and no data needed to be removed
from any analysis.
Results
A summary of the outcome measures for the cognitive tasks is
presented in Table 1. A wide range of scores was obtained for all
variables.
How Are the Tasks Interrelated?
We first asked whether performance across the tasks of primary
interest (scene construction, autobiographical memory, future
thinking and navigation), was related. If, in line with our predic-
tion, these tasks share an underlying cognitive process, then per-
formance on one task should be related to performance on the
others. More generally, we also sought to investigate this within
the wider context of the other cognitive tasks.
We performed a PCA using all of the tasks in order to avoid
selection bias—we had no reason to exclude any task from the
PCA. Varimax rotation was applied (to allow for cross-over be-
tween the derived components) and the minimum eigenvalue was
set to 1. The PCA identified seven components that explained
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59.24% of the variance. Examination of the Scree plot supported
the seven component solution (see the online supplementary ma-
terials and Supplemental Figure S1).
Naming of the components was determined by the tasks that
most strongly loaded on to each (see Table 2 for the proportion of
variance explained by each component, Table 3 for the tasks in
each component and their weightings, and Supplemental Table S6
in the online supplementary materials for all weightings). Compo-
nent 1 comprised tasks with a particularly strong spatial compo-
nent (e.g., navigation, object-place association, paper folding).
Notably, this was regardless of whether or not memory was re-
quired; for example, the Paper Folding Test and the Brixton Spatial
Anticipation Test had minimal memory requirements. Component
2 contained all of the verbal memory tasks. Component 3 com-
prised those tasks typically thought to assess general IQ or exec-
utive function. Matrix Reasoning and the estimate of FSIQ from
the TOPF are designed to be measures of general IQ (Wechsler,
2008, 2011), the Symbol Span and Digit Span Tests measure
executive function, working memory, and attention (Wechsler,
2008, 2009), and the F-A-S is reported as an executive function
task (Strauss et al., 2006). Finally, although the Abstract Verbal
Paired Associates test is a verbal memory task (and aligns also
with Component 2), it is a more challenging task than the other
verbal memory tasks—as shown by the performance scores in
Table 1—and has also been found to require the recruitment of
frontal “executive” brain regions (Clark et al., 2018), suggesting
that processing of abstract verbal paired associates may reflect
general IQ as well as verbal memory. Component 4 involved three
of our tasks of primary interest: scene construction, autobiograph-
ical memory (internal details) and future thinking, and the inclu-
sion of the simple scene description task (which also loaded onto
the perceptual component). For convenience, we refer to this
component as the scene component, as per our hypothesis that
these tasks have scenes in common but acknowledge that this
remains to be tested in our following analyses. Component 5
contained the three recognition memory tests and Component 6 the
two semantic tasks. Finally, Component 7, while also using scene-
based stimuli, contained the two tasks that primarily assessed
visual perception.
There are, however, two potential limitations to the PCA that
should be noted. First, it could be suggested that inclusion of FSIQ
in the PCA reduces the pool of domain-specific variance that can
be partitioned because FSIQ could be regarded as a more nonspe-
cific cognitive task. To ensure FSIQ scores were not biasing the
results, we performed the PCA again without the FSIQ scores,
finding a near identical pattern of results (see Supplemental Table
Table 1
Means With 95% Confidence Intervals (CIs) for All Cognitive Tasks
Variable Mean Lower CI Upper CI
Scene Construction Experiential Index (/60) 40.50 29.50 50.13
Autobiographical memory internal details (total number) 23.95 13.80 37.42
Autobiographical memory external details (total number) 5.35 1.40 11.24
Future Thinking Experiential Index (/60) 39.12 25.00 49.99
Navigation (/250) 143.46 88.90 201.50
Full Scale Intelligence Quotienta 102.75 92.04 114.35
Matrix Reasoning scaled score (/19) 12.53 8.00 17.00
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test scaled score (/10) 7.87 5.00 10.00
F-A-S Verbal Fluency (total number of words) 49.09 30.90 69.00
Digit Span scaled score (/37—sum of backwards and forwards) 22.08 14.00 34.00
Symbol Span scaled score (/19) 9.35 6.00 13.00
Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure delayed recall (/36) 22.28 12.45 31.00
Object-Place Association Test (/6) 2.31 .00 6.00
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test delayed recall (/15) 12.92 8.90 15.00
Logical Memory delayed recall scaled score (/19) 12.58 8.00 17.00
WMS Verbal Paired Associates delayed recall (/14) 13.38 10.00 14.00
Concrete Verbal Paired Associates delayed recall (/14) 12.94 8.00 14.00
Abstract Verbal Paired Associates delayed recall (/14) 7.03 1.00 13.10
Warrington Recognition Memory Test for Words scaled score (/15) 12.75 7.00 14.00
Warrington Recognition Memory Test for Faces scaled score (/18) 11.00 4.00 16.00
Warrington Recognition Memory Test for Scenes raw score (/50) 43.35 35.00 49.00
Dead or Alive Task proportion correct (%) 81.32 66.12 94.52
Paper Folding Test (/20) 13.14 6.00 19.00
Scene description (total number of details) 24.88 15.90 37.10
Boundary extension proportion of “closer” responses (%) 42.26 8.33 79.17
Note. WMS  Wechsler Memory Scale; CI  confidence interval. Task order is for display purposes only.
a Estimated from the Test of Premorbid Functioning.
Table 2
Proportion of Variance Explained by Each Principal Component
Analysis Component
PCA component Variance explained
Total 59.24%
C1. Spatial processing 12.44%
C2. Verbal memory 10.64%
C3. General IQ/Executive function 9.85%
C4. Scenes 9.23%
C5. Recognition memory 6.81%
C6. Semantic memory 5.28%
C7. Perception 5.01%
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S7 in the online supplementary materials). The only notable effect
of removing FSIQ was that Components 3 and 4 were switched,
with the scene component now explaining a greater proportion of
the variance than the IQ/executive function component.
Second, the selection of the number of components from a PCA
is, at least in part, a subjective decision. From the scree plot, it
could be argued that our PCA should only result in four factors,
rather than seven. However, as has been widely discussed in the
literature, determining the number of components to include re-
quires the balancing of parsimony and plausibility (see, e.g., Fab-
rigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999), with the selection
of too few components being typically regarded as a much more
severe error than too many (Cattell, 1978; Fava & Velicer, 1992;
Rummel, 1970; Wood, Tataryn, & Gorsuch, 1996). As detailed in
the online supplementary materials, restricting the model to four
components meant that two tasks (Dead or Alive, Boundary Ex-
tension) loaded onto none of the components. Furthermore, limit-
ing the solution to four components led to the loss of the recog-
nition memory, semantic memory, and perception components,
resulting, for example, in the Warrington Recognition Memory
Test for faces loading onto the verbal memory component. As
such, specifying only four components obscured theoretically
plausible and relevant components as well as leading to difficulties
in interpretation. On the other hand, the seven-component solution
was statistically valid, created a clear factor structure with all the
tests included, and all components had both statistical and theo-
retical value.
We also note that our main focus here was on scene construc-
tion, autobiographical memory, future thinking and navigation,
and investigating how performance on these tasks is related in the
presence of other cognitive tasks. Regardless of the above issues—
the inclusion/exclusion of FSIQ and the selection of either four or
seven components—our main tasks of interest followed the same
loadings and the scene and spatial components remained within the
top four explanatory components.
In summary, performance on the scene construction, autobio-
graphical memory (internal details), and future thinking tasks all
aligned onto the same component. This demonstrates that these
tasks are strongly related in cognitive terms. However, surpris-
ingly, the navigation task did not load onto this component, but
instead loaded onto the spatial component—a point we will return
to later.
Although the PCA can tell us about the main relationships
between tasks, it cannot inform about the nature of the underlying
processes. We therefore proceeded to perform additional analyses
to examine this.
What Cognitive Process(es) Underpin the
Scene Component?
The PCA analysis identified that, with the exception of naviga-
tion, our tasks of primary interest—scene construction, autobio-
graphical memory internal details (henceforth referred to as auto-
biographical memory), and future thinking—all loaded onto one
component—scenes. As the scene description task also loaded
onto the perception component as well as the scene component, it
was not included in the following analyses to allow for the assess-
ment of just the pure elements of the scene component.
Table 3
Details of the Principal Component Analysis With Varimax Rotation of the Cognitive Tasks







Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure delayed recall .72
Paper Folding Test .72
Navigation .66
Object-Place Association Test .65
Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test .42
Warrington Recognition Memory Test for Scenes .54 .41
Matrix Reasoning .51 .49
Symbol Span .46 .46
Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test delayed recall .74
Concrete Verbal Paired Associates delayed recall .67
Logical Memory delayed recall .66
WMS Verbal Paired Associates delayed recall .62
Abstract Verbal Paired Associates delayed recall .61 .46
Digit Span .74
Full Scale Intelligence Quotient .68
F-A-S Verbal Fluency .62
Scene Construction Experiential Index .87
Future Thinking Experiential Index .85
Autobiographical Memory Internal Details .62
Scene Description .37 .50
Warrington Recognition Memory Test for Words .67
Warrington Recognition Memory Test for Faces .79
Autobiographical Memory External Details .69
Dead or Alive Task .62
Boundary Extension .84
Note. WMS  Wechsler Memory Scale. Task order is for display purposes only. Only values over .35 are reported for ease of viewing, full results are
presented in Supplementary Materials Table S6 in the online supplemental material.
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We used mediation analyses to investigate possible processes
underpinning the scene component. This method aims to explain
the mechanisms and/or processes underlying the relationship be-
tween two variables via the inclusion of a third variable. If the third
variable fully mediates the original relationship, this provides
evidence that the link between the original variables can be ex-
plained solely due to the mediating variable. This is known as an
indirect effect. On the other hand, if no indirect effect is identified,
leaving only the direct relationship between the original variables,
it can be concluded that the mediating variable is not involved in
the original relationship. For a mediation analysis to be possible,
there are two main requirements, as described by Baron and Kenny
(1986). First, the independent variable must be a predictor of the
dependent variable. Second, the independent variable must predict
the mediator variable. The first requirement has, however, been
further scrutinised, with some suggesting that an initial direct
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent
variable is not required when there is a strong a priori belief that
the effect size is small or suppression is a possibility (e.g., Shrout
& Bolger, 2002). However, given our substantial sample size and
ability to detect small effect sizes, we followed the more stringent
requirements set out by Baron and Kenny (1986) to reduce the
possibility of false positives. A mediation analysis then looks at the
difference between predicting the dependent variable from just
the independent variable, in comparison to predicting the depen-
dent variable from the independent variable and the mediator
variable. If the relationship between the independent and depen-
dent variable is reduced, or lost, with the inclusion of the mediator,
an indirect effect has occurred.
Mediation can, therefore, be applied to our question in the
following manner—if the process linking the scene component
tasks is, as we hypothesize, related to scenes, the scene construc-
tion task should mediate the relationship between autobiographical
memory and future thinking. Alternatively, if, as hypothesized by
others, the underlying process is associated with autobiographical
memory, then autobiographical memory will mediate the relation-
ship between scene construction and future thinking. This was,
therefore, our first analysis.
Before reporting the results, it is worth explaining the presen-
tation format. A mediation analysis has two main steps. First, the
initial regressions are performed to ensure mediation is possible.
For ease of reading, the full details of each individual regression
are reported in the online supplementary materials and just the
unstandardized coefficients are reported in the main body of the
text. Second, the mediation analysis itself is performed. The me-
diation analysis provides two outcome measures: (a) the media-
tion, or indirect, effect; if this is significant there is an effect of
mediation, and (b) the direct effect; if this is significant then a
relationship remains between the original variables even with the
inclusion of the mediator. If just the indirect effect is significant,
then a full mediation has occurred. This means that all of the
relationship between the independent and dependent variable can
be explained by the mediator. If both the indirect and the direct
effect are significant then a partial mediation has occurred. This
means that some of the relationship between the independent and
dependent variables can be explained by the mediator, but the
independent variable still contributes to the relationship. If only the
direct effect is significant, then mediation has not occurred.
In a similar manner to other statistical analyses, it is important
to look not just at whether a result is significant, but how robust
this effect is. For mediation, this is done via sensitivity analyses.
Sensitivity analyses test how well the (indirect or direct) effect
holds if additional variance is introduced into the necessary as-
sumptions made to perform the analysis (see Imai et al., 2010).
Sensitivity analyses are different from effect sizes in that there are
no specific cut offs. Instead, they are used comparatively. As such,
sensitivity is reported here in two forms, first, as a single value
(between 1 and 1) that represents the amount of additional
variance needed to reduce the effect seen to 0. A higher absolute
value represents a more robust effect. Second, we also display
sensitivity as a plot showing the effect of varying the additional
variance on the indirect or direct effect. This allows for a visual
interpretation of the robustness of the effect.
Returning to the analyses, our overarching question was whether
a scene construction or an autobiographical memory process best
explained the relationships identified between scene construction,
autobiographical memory, and future thinking. We, therefore, sys-
tematically examined the different combinations of the relation-
ships between these three variables. First, we investigated whether
scene construction mediated the relationship between autobio-
graphical memory and future thinking, or whether autobiographi-
cal memory mediated between scene construction and future think-
ing. Second, we also examined these relationships when future
thinking was included as the independent instead of the dependent
variable. Finally, for completeness, we investigated whether future
thinking mediated the relationship between scene construction and
autobiographical memory. Testing each of these in turn resulted in
a complete examination of possible mediations between the three
tasks.
First, therefore, we sought to examine whether scene construc-
tion mediated the relationship between autobiographical memory
and future thinking, and whether autobiographical memory medi-
ated the relationship between scene construction and future think-
ing. The results of the mediation analyses are shown in Table 4 and
Figure 1 (see Supplemental Table S8 in the online supplementary
materials for the full break down of each individual regression).
Figure 1a shows the relationship between autobiographical mem-
Table 4
Mediation Analyses of the Scene Component Variables When
Future Thinking is the Dependent Variable
Effect Beta [95% CI] p Sensitivity ()
a
Autobiographical memory to future thinking, mediated by scene
construction
Indirect effect .32 [.23, .43] .001 .75
Direct effect .06 [.03, .15] .17 .2
Total .39 [.26, .51] .001 n/a
b
Scene construction to future thinking, mediated by autobiographical
memory
Indirect effect .032 [.014, .08] .16 .1
Direct effect .90 [80, 1.02] .001 .95
Total .94 [84, 1.04] .001 n/a
Note. CI  confidence interval.
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ory and future thinking, mediated by scene construction. As ex-
pected, autobiographical memory alone was associated with both
future thinking (  .39, p  .001) and scene construction ( 
.36, p  .001). This shows that mediation by scene construction
was possible. Indeed, with the inclusion of scene construction as a
mediator, autobiographical memory was no longer related to future
thinking (  .063, p  .18), whereas scene construction was
(  .90, p  .001). Mediation analysis revealed a significant
indirect effect of scene construction, with no direct effect of
autobiographical memory (Table 4a). This, therefore, suggests that
scene construction fully mediated (explained) the relationship be-
tween autobiographical memory and future thinking.
Table 4b and Figure 1b show the equivalent analysis where
autobiographical memory was placed as the mediator between
scene construction and future thinking. As would be expected, the
result matches the previous analysis, but with the indirect and
direct effects switched. As with autobiographical memory, scene
construction alone was associated with both future thinking ( 
.94, p  .001) and autobiographical memory (  .51, p  .001).
This means that mediation by autobiographical memory was pos-
sible. However, including autobiographical memory as the medi-
ator failed to show a relationship between autobiographical mem-
ory and future thinking (  .063, p  .18), whereas the
relationship between scene construction and future thinking re-
mained significant (  .90, p  .001). This was confirmed by the
mediation analysis finding no indirect effect of autobiographical
memory in comparison to the significant direct effect of scene
construction. In other words, autobiographical memory could not
explain the relationship between scene construction and future
thinking. This contrasts with the previous analysis showing that
scene construction could explain the relationship between autobi-
ographical memory and future thinking.
We next performed sensitivity analyses for each of the effects
(Table 4 and Figure 2). We first focused on when scene construc-
tion was the mediator between autobiographical memory and
future thinking (Table 4a and Figures 2a and 2b). As can be seen
from the sensitivity values, the indirect effect of scene construction
(  .75) was substantially more robust than the direct relationship
between autobiographical memory future and thinking (  .2).
On Figure 2 the dashed line represents the average effect, and the
plotted line shows what happened to the effect when additional
variance is taken into consideration. As can be seen in Figure 2a,
the indirect effect only disappeared (i.e., crosses the x-axis) when
additional variance was very high, compared to the lower variance
required for the loss of the direct effect (Figure 2b).
A similar, reverse, story was observed when autobiographical
memory was used as the mediator between scene construction and
future thinking. The autobiographical memory indirect sensitivity
rapidly crossed the x-axis (  .1, Figure 2c) in comparison to the
much higher sensitivity of the direct scene construction to future
thinking relationship (  .95, Figure 2d). Overall, therefore, the
effect of scene construction (both as a mediator and directly) was
considerably more robust than autobiographical memory, lending
additional support to our mediation results. In summary, these first
mediation analyses showed that scene construction could explain
the relationship between autobiographical memory and future
thinking. On the other hand, autobiographical memory could not
explain the scene construction-future thinking relationship.
Next, we investigated the relationships within the scene com-
ponent when future thinking was included as the independent
instead of the dependent variable (Table 5, Figure 3). As would be
expected, future thinking was associated with both autobiograph-
ical memory (  .39, p  .001) and scene construction (  .66,
p  .001). This shows that mediation was possible by both
autobiographical memory and scene construction (full regression
details are provided in Supplemental Table S9 in the online sup-
plementary material). However, as before, whereas the relationship
between future thinking and autobiographical memory was fully
mediated by scene construction (Table 5a and Figure 3a), the
relationship between future thinking and scene construction was
only partially mediated by autobiographical memory (Table 5b and
Figure 3b). That is, although scene construction could fully explain
the relationship between future thinking and autobiographical
memory, future thinking was still associated with scene construc-
tion even with the additional presence of autobiographical mem-
ory.
Looking at the sensitivity analyses, the indirect effect of scene
construction on the future thinking-autobiographical memory re-
lationship was small but robust in comparison to the nonsignificant
direct effect of future thinking (  .2 vs.   .1; Figures 4a and
4b respectively). This supports the mediating role of scene con-
struction on the relationship between future thinking and autobi-
ographical memory. When comparing the sensitivity values for the
mediation of autobiographical memory on the future thinking–
scene construction relationship, the direct relationship between
future thinking and scene construction was much more robust
(  .95, Figure 4d) than the indirect effect of autobiographical
memory (  .2, Figure 4c). This highlights that although auto-
biographical memory may have been contributing something ad-
ditional to the future thinking–scene construction relationship, it
was to a much lesser extent than that of future thinking itself.
Finally, for completeness, we also examined whether future
thinking mediated the relationship between scene construction and
autobiographical memory. Although theoretical accounts empha-
size either scene construction or autobiographical memory as the
underlying cognitive process of future thinking, the reverse re-
Figure 1. Mediation analyses of the scene component variables
when future thinking is the dependent variable. (a) Autobiographical mem-
ory to future thinking, mediated by scene construction. (b) Scene construc-
tion to future thinking, mediated by autobiographical memory. The num-
bers in brackets show the effect of the independent variable on the
dependent when the mediation variable was also taken into consideration.
 p  .001. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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mains possible. However, as can be seen in Table 5a and Figure 3a
there was no direct effect between future thinking and autobio-
graphical memory with the inclusion of scene construction as the
mediator. This, therefore, suggests that future thinking cannot
explain the relationship between scene construction and autobio-
graphical memory.
Overall, following a systematic examination of the different
configurations of scene construction, autobiographical memory,
and future thinking, we observed a consistent mediation by scene
construction in the various combinations of the relationships be-
tween our tasks of primary interest. On the other hand, autobio-
graphical memory seemed to have only limited input. Furthermore,
future thinking also failed to explain the relationship between
autobiographical memory and scene construction.
In summary, we aimed to assess the underlying psychological
process of the scene component. We predicted that the process of
scene construction would best explain the relationships between
the three tasks. In line with our prediction, scene construction fully
mediated the relationship from autobiographical memory to future
thinking and from future thinking to autobiographical memory.
Autobiographical memory recall, on the other hand, did not con-
tribute to the relationship from scene construction to future think-
ing, and only partially mediated the effect of future thinking on
scene construction. It seems, therefore, that a key process under-
pinning the scene component is indeed related to the mental
construction of scene imagery.
How Does the Scene Component Relate to Navigation?
The scene component only contained three of our tasks of
primary interest. The fourth, navigation, aligned instead with the
spatial component. Nevertheless, navigation has long been asso-
Figure 2. Sensitivity analyses for the indirect and direct effects of the mediation analyses of the scene
component variables, when future thinking was the dependent variable. (a) Sensitivity of the indirect effect of
scene construction on the relationship between autobiographical memory and future thinking. (b) Sensitivity of
the direct effect between autobiographical memory and future thinking, when scene construction was taken into
consideration. (c) Sensitivity of the indirect effect of autobiographical memory on the relationship between scene
construction and future thinking. (d) Sensitivity of the direct effect between scene construction and future
thinking, when autobiographical memory was taken into consideration. The dashed line shows the average effect
when additional variance is assumed to be 0. The plotted line shows the variation in the effect when the
additional variance was varied between 1 and 1 (with 95% confidence intervals). The more robust the effect,
the greater the variance that was required to reduce the effect to 0 (i.e., to cross the x-axis).
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ciated with hippocampal function (Maguire et al., 2000; O’Keefe
& Nadel, 1978) and more recently with scene construction (Magu-
ire & Mullally, 2013). Consequently, we also tested whether there
was any kind of relationship between the tasks of the scene
component and navigation.
To do this, we performed mediation analyses involving scene
construction, autobiographical memory, future thinking, and nav-
igation. We aimed to establish whether there was an underlying
link between the scene component variables and navigation, pre-
dicting that there would be, and that this would be scene construc-
tion and not autobiographical memory. As such, we first investi-
gated whether scene construction mediated the relationship
between autobiographical memory and navigation. This was then
followed by examination of whether autobiographical memory
mediated the relationship between scene construction and naviga-
tion.
The results of the mediation analyses are shown in Table 6 and
Figure 5 (see also Supplemental Table S10 in the online supple-
mentary materials for the full break down of the regression anal-
yses). Figure 5a shows the relationship between autobiographical
memory and navigation with scene construction as the mediator.
First, we observed that autobiographical memory was related to
both scene construction (  .36, p  .001) and navigation ( 
.99, p  .003). This confirmed that mediation by scene construc-
tion was possible. Then, importantly, we found that with scene
construction included as the mediator, autobiographical memory
was no longer related to navigation (  .46, p  .2), while scene
construction was (  1.48, p  .001). Mediation analysis re-
vealed this to be a significant indirect effect of scene construction,
with a nonsignificant direct effect of autobiographical memory
(Table 6a and Figure 5a). This suggested that scene construction
fully explained the relationship between autobiographical memory
and navigation.
In contrast, Figure 5b shows the relationship between scene
construction and navigation mediated by autobiographical mem-
ory. Again, we found that scene construction was related to both
autobiographical memory (  .51, p .001) and navigation ( 
1.71, p  .001). As such, mediation by autobiographical memory
was possible. However, when autobiographical memory was in-
cluded as the mediator, no relationship was found between auto-
biographical memory and navigation (  .46, p  .2). Notably,
the direct effect between scene construction and navigation re-
mained significant (  1.48, p  .001). Mediation analyses
confirmed a significant direct effect in the absence of an indirect
effect (Table 6b). This, therefore, suggests that autobiographical
memory had no influence on the relationship between scene con-
struction and navigation.
Sensitivity analyses supported both sets of findings, suggesting
more robust effects of scene construction than autobiographical
memory. This was apparent both when scene construction was
mediating the relationship of autobiographical memory and navi-
gation, and for the direct relationship between scene construction
and navigation (Table 6 and Figure 6). Overall, these results
suggest that scene construction may underpin the relationship
between autobiographical memory and navigation.
We next investigated whether scene construction would also
mediate the future thinking to navigation relationship. Once again,
we compared this to the mediating ability of autobiographical
memory. The results of the mediation analyses are shown in Table
7 and Figure 7 (see Supplemental Table S11 in the online supple-
mentary materials for the individual regressions). Figure 7a shows
the relationship between future thinking and navigation, mediated
by scene construction. Future thinking was related to both navi-
gation (  1.24, p  .001) and scene construction (  .66, p 
.001). This confirmed that mediation by scene construction was
possible. With the inclusion of scene construction as the mediator,
future thinking was no longer related to navigation (  .29, p 
.58), while scene construction was (  1.44, p  .022). Media-
tion analysis identified a significant indirect effect of scene con-
struction, with no direct effect of future thinking (Table 7a). This,
therefore, suggests that scene construction fully mediated the re-
lationship between future thinking and navigation, in addition to
mediating the autobiographical memory to navigation relationship
reported above.
On the other hand, Figure 7b shows the relationship between
future thinking and navigation, mediated by autobiographical
Figure 3. Mediation analyses of the scene component variables, when
future thinking is the independent variable. (a) Future thinking to autobi-
ographical memory, mediated by scene construction. (b) Future thinking to
scene construction, mediated by autobiographical memory. The numbers in
brackets show the effect of the independent variable on the dependent
when the mediation variable was also taken into consideration.  p  .01.
 p  .001. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
Table 5
Mediation Analyses of the Scene Component Variables When
Future Thinking is the Independent Variable
Effect Beta [95% CI] p Sensitivity ()
a
Future thinking to autobiographical memory, mediated by scene
construction
Indirect effect .25 [.10, .41] .001 .2
Direct effect .14 [.056, .32] .16 .1
Total .39 [.27, .51] .001 n/a
b
Future thinking to scene construction, mediated by autobiographical
memory
Indirect effect .047 [.017, .08] .001 .2
Direct effect .62 [.54, .69] .001 .95
Total .66 [.59, .73] .001 n/a
Note. CI  confidence interval.
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memory. Future thinking was again found to be related to both
autobiographical memory (  .39, p .001) and navigation ( 
1.24, p  .001). This confirmed that mediation by autobiograph-
ical memory was possible. However, including autobiographical
memory as the mediating variable had limited effect; future think-
ing remained associated with navigation (  1.01, p .0045) and
there was no relationship between autobiographical memory and
navigation (  .59, p  .093). Mediation analysis confirmed the
absence of an indirect effect of autobiographical memory and the
presence of a significant direct effect from future thinking to
navigation (Table 7b).
As before, sensitivity analyses were performed to test for the
robustness of the effects. These showed, first, a more robust
indirect effect of scene construction (  .15, Figure 8a) than the
direct relationship between future thinking and navigation
(  .05, Figure 8b). Second, a more robust direct effect of
future thinking on navigation (  .45, Figure 8d) in comparison
to the indirect effect of autobiographical memory (  .1, Figure
8c). This supports the mediation analyses.
We do, however, note that here we have two possible mediators
for the future thinking navigation relationship. In addition, the
finding of a significant indirect effect of scene construction in
comparison to the absence of an indirect effect of autobiographical
memory does not necessarily confirm that scene construction is
more important than autobiographical memory. We therefore per-
formed an additional analysis with both scene construction and
autobiographical memory included as potential mediators on the
future thinking navigation relationship at the same time. We found
a significant indirect effect of scene construction (  .84; 95% CI
[.015, 1.67], p  .046) in the absence of an indirect effect of
autobiographical memory (  .17; 95% CI [.10, .45], p  .22)
and no direct relationship between future thinking and navigation
Figure 4. Sensitivity analyses for the indirect and direct effects of the mediation analyses of the scene
component variables when future thinking was the independent variable. (a) Sensitivity of the indirect effect of
scene construction on the relationship between future thinking and autobiographical memory. (b) Sensitivity of
the direct effect between future thinking and autobiographical memory, when scene construction was taken into
consideration. (c) Sensitivity of the indirect effect of autobiographical memory on the relationship between
future thinking and scene construction. (d) Sensitivity of the direct effect between future thinking and scene
construction, when autobiographical memory was taken into consideration. The dashed line shows the average
effect when additional error is assumed to be 0. The plotted line shows the variation in the effect when the
additional error is varied between 1 and 1 (with 95% confidence intervals). The more robust the effect, the
greater the variance that was required to reduce the effect to 0 (i.e., to cross the x-axis).
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(  .23; 95% CI [.79, 1.26], p  .66). This, therefore, supports
our previous analyses in demonstrating the importance of scene
construction, and the absence of the influence of autobiographical
memory, in relating the scene component to navigation.
Does Scene Construction Retain Influence on
Navigation When Spatial Processing Is Taken Into
Account?
The results so far suggest that the process of scene construction
may underpin the relationship between our main tasks of primary
interest (i.e., scene construction, autobiographical memory, future
thinking and navigation). However, it is important to acknowledge
that in our initial PCA, navigation loaded on the spatial component
and not the scene component. This tells us that although scene
processing may have some relationship with navigation (as shown
by the analyses above), navigation is still closely associated with
spatial processing. Consequently, this raises the question of
whether scene construction only plays a role in the relationship
between the scene component tasks and navigation in the absence
of spatial processing.
To investigate this, we took a similar mediation approach as
before, now using the spatial and scene components of the PCA.
As such, we asked whether the tasks of the scene component
would mediate the relationship between the tasks of the spatial
component and navigation. We did this in two ways. First, we
examined the effects of including all three tasks of the scene
component together as a combined mediator variable, to bal-
ance the inclusion of the combined spatial component tasks as
the independent variable. Second, we placed scene construc-
tion, autobiographical memory and future thinking in turn as
separate mediator variables to see if the three tasks of the scene
component had differing mediating effects on the spatial com-
ponent to navigation relationship.
Latent variables were used to represent the scene and spatial
components. The latent variables were comprised of the tasks that
loaded singularly onto the respective components. This allowed for
assessment of only the pure elements of each component. For the
spatial component this was the ROCF (delayed recall), the Paper
Folding Test, the Object-Place Association Test, and the Brixton
Spatial Anticipation Test. For the scene component, the tests were
scene construction, autobiographical memory, and future thinking.
To perform a mediation analysis using latent variables, a structural
equation modeling (SEM) approach was taken. Aside from the
inclusion of latent variables, however, the principles of the anal-
ysis remained the same as the mediation analyses reported above.
The only exception being that sensitivity analyses can no longer be
conducted; judgments are made in SEM on the goodness of model
fit.
Figure 9 shows the SEM of the relationship between the spatial
component and navigation, mediated by the scene component (see
also see Supplemental Table S12 in the online supplementary
materials for full details of individual paths). The latent variables
(spatial and scene PCA components) are shown in circles, the
observed variables (the cognitive tasks) in rectangles. The numer-
ical values represent the unstandardized coefficients of the path in
question. Overall model fit was good, in line with published
recommendations (Hu & Bentler, 1999), 2(18)  20.70, p  .30;
comparative fit index (CFI)  .99; Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 
.99; root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)  .026,
90% CI [0, .068]; standardized root mean square residual
(SRMR)  .035. As would be expected, the ROCF, the Paper
Folding Test, the Object-Place Association Test, and the Brixton
Spatial Anticipation Test all loaded significantly onto the spatial
latent variable (Beta coefficients respectively of 3.87, p  .001;
2.59, p  .001; 1.18, p  .001; .66, p  .001). In addition, scene
construction, future thinking, and autobiographical memory all
loaded significantly onto the scene latent variable (Beta coeffi-
cients, respectively, of 5.45, p  .001; 5.87, p  .001; 3.21, p 
.001). Of key relevance to our question of interest, the spatial
component was associated with the scene component (  .28,
p  .002), and both the spatial and scene components were
associated with navigation (  22.71, p  .001;   4.87, p 
.03, respectively). This indicates that the scene component par-
tially mediated the relationship between the spatial component and
navigation. This is supported by a mediation analysis finding a
significant indirect effect of the scene component (  1.35; 95%
CI [.093, 2.62], p  .035). Unsurprisingly, the spatial component
Table 6
Mediation Analyses of the Scene construction, Autobiographical
Memory and Navigation Relationships
Effect Beta [95% CI] p Sensitivity
a
Autobiographical memory to navigation, mediated by scene construction
Indirect effect .53 [.21, .90] .001 .25
Direct effect .45 [.25, 1.13] .21 .2
Total .98 [.32, 1.64] .003 n/a
b
Scene construction to navigation, mediated by autobiographical memory
Indirect effect .23 [.12, .61] .20 .1
Direct effect 1.49 [.66, 2.33] .001 .5
Total 1.72 [.99, 2.47] .001 n/a
Note. CI  confidence interval.
Figure 5. Mediation analyses of the scene construction, autobiographical
memory and navigation relationships. (a) Autobiographical memory to
navigation, mediated by scene construction. (b) Scene construction to
navigation, mediated by autobiographical memory. The numbers in brack-
ets show the effect of the independent variable on the dependent when the
mediation variable was also taken into account.  p  .01.  p  .001.
See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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remained associated with navigation even with the introduction of
the Scene component.
Hence, we see a partial mediation by the scene component in
comparison to the full mediations observed earlier. Overall, this
suggests that scene processing had an influence on navigation even
when the spatial component was taken into account.
As the scene component was made up of three variables, we
next tested whether the partial mediation by the scene component
on the spatial component to navigation relationship was specifi-
cally due to scene construction or could also be explained by
autobiographical memory or future thinking. We therefore re-
peated the SEM three more times, replacing the scene component
with each individual task in turn. Figure 10 shows the results of the
three SEMs using scene construction, autobiographical memory,
or future thinking as the mediator on the spatial component to
navigation relationship. As before, all models showed acceptable
fit—scene construction mediation: 2(8)  14.84, p  .062;
CFI  .97; TLI  .94; RMSEA  .063 (90% CI [0, .11]);
SRMR  .038; autobiographical memory mediation: 2(8) 
15.04, p  .058; CFI  .97; TLI  .94; RMSEA  .064 (90% CI
[0, .11]); SRMR  .038; and future thinking mediation: 2(8) 
15.43, p  .051; CFI  .97; TLI  .94; RMSEA  .065 (90% CI
[0, .11]); SRMR  .039.
Notably, the patterns of mediation differed in each model. As
can be seen in Figure 10a (see also Supplemental Table S13 in the
online supplementary materials), when scene construction was
used as the mediator, an indirect effect was observed. The spatial
component was associated with scene construction (  1.48, p 
.002) and both the spatial component and scene construction were
associated with navigation (  22.89, p  .001;   .79, p 
.026, respectively). This indicates that, just like the overall scene
Figure 6. Sensitivity analyses for the indirect and direct effects of the mediation analyses of the scene
construction, autobiographical memory and navigation relationships. (a) Sensitivity of the indirect effect of scene
construction on the relationship between autobiographical memory and navigation. (b) Sensitivity of the direct
effect between autobiographical memory and navigation, when scene construction was taken into consideration.
(c) Sensitivity of the indirect effect of autobiographical memory on the relationship between scene construction
and navigation. (d) Sensitivity of the direct effect between scene construction and navigation, when autobio-
graphical memory was taken into consideration. The dashed line shows the average effect when additional error
is assumed to be 0. The plotted line shows the variation in the effect when the additional error is varied
between 1 and 1 (with 95% confidence intervals). The more robust the effect, the greater the variance that was
required to reduce the effect to 0 (i.e., to cross the x-axis).
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component, scene construction partially mediated the relationship
between the Spatial component and navigation. This was sup-
ported by a mediation analysis finding a significant indirect effect
of scene construction (  1.17; 95% CI [.079, 2.26], p  .036).
On the other hand, Figure 10b (see also Supplemental Table S14
in the online supplementary materials), shows the effect of using
autobiographical memory as the mediator. Whereas the spatial
component continued to be associated with navigation (  23.57,
p  .001), the spatial component was not associated with autobi-
ographical memory (  .81, p  .17). As such, although auto-
biographical memory itself was related to navigation (  .62, p
.031), as there was no relationship between the spatial component
and autobiographical memory; these effects were nonmediating.
This was supported by the mediation analysis finding no indirect
effect of autobiographical memory (  .50; 95% CI [.23, 1.24],
p  .18).
Finally, Figure 10c (see also Supplemental Table S15 in the
online supplementary materials) shows the indirect effect of future
thinking. Here, the spatial component was associated with both
future thinking (  1.74, p  .003) and navigation (  23.26,
p  .001). However, there was no relationship between future
thinking and navigation when the spatial component was taken
into consideration (  .47, p  .12). This suggests that future
thinking had no indirect effect on the spatial component to navi-
gation relationship. This was supported by the mediation analysis
(  .81; 95% CI [.20, 1.83], p  .12).
Overall, therefore, we found that scene construction played a
role in the relationship between spatial processing and navigation.
This is observed by the indirect effects of both the overarching
scene component, and more specifically when just using scene
construction. On the other hand, neither autobiographical memory
nor future thinking mediated the spatial component to navigation
relationship. To that end, even in the presence of other highly
associated spatial tasks, scene construction continued to be a key
process involved in navigation.
Discussion
Autobiographical memory, future thinking, spatial navigation
and the imagination of scene imagery are critical cognitive func-
tions that are typically regarded as being related, primarily because
they are all hippocampal-dependent. Until now, direct evidence for
their interrelatedness has been lacking, as has an understanding of
why they might be related. There were four main findings from the
current study that spoke to these issues. First, using a PCA, we
found that, in the presence of other cognitive tasks, scene con-
struction, autobiographical memory, and future thinking all loaded
onto the same component, confirming a strong relationship be-
tween these variables. Navigation on the other hand, loaded more
strongly with spatial tasks. Second, we showed that scene con-
struction fully mediated the relationship between autobiographical
memory and future thinking, while autobiographical memory did
not mediate between scene construction and future thinking, nor
did future thinking mediate between scene construction and auto-
biographical memory. Third, we found that scene construction
fully mediated the relationships between future thinking and au-
tobiographical memory with navigation, whereas autobiographical
memory did not mediate the relationships between future thinking
and scene construction with navigation. Finally, we observed a
partial mediation by scene construction on the relationship be-
tween the spatial tasks and navigation, compared to no mediation
of autobiographical memory or future thinking. Overall, our results
suggest that scene construction may be a significant cognitive
process underlying the relationships between these different func-
tions that are each associated with the hippocampus.
The crucial role of visual imagery is well documented across
multiple cognitive domains, including autobiographical memory,
future thinking, and navigation (Andrews-Hanna, Saxe, &
Yarkoni, 2014; Greenberg & Knowlton, 2014; Kraemer et al.,
2017). Why might scene imagery in particular be at the heart of
these important cognitive functions? One reason is that scene
imagery allows us to build models of the world that mirror our
moment-by-moment perception. Scenes are also a highly efficient
means of packaging information and, as such, are an economical
use of cognitive resources (e.g., Konkle, Brady, Alvarez, & Oliva,
2010). Through the construction of a visual scene we can incor-
Table 7
Mediation Analyses of the Future Thinking to Navigation
Relationship With Scene Construction or Autobiographical
Memory as the Mediating Variable
Effect Beta [95% CI] p Sensitivity
a
Future thinking to navigation, mediated by scene construction
Indirect effect .94 [.11, 1.76] .025 .15
Direct effect .31 [.73, 1.33] .56 .05
Total 1.25 [.60, 1.87] .001 n/a
b
Future thinking to navigation, mediated by autobiographical memory
Indirect effect .23 [.034, .54] .088 .10
Direct effect 1.01 [.29, 1.70] .0024 .45
Total 1.25 [.60, 1.90] .001 n/a
Note. CI  confidence interval.
Figure 7. Mediation analyses of the future thinking to navigation rela-
tionship with scene construction or autobiographical memory as the me-
diating variable. (a) Future thinking to navigation, mediated by scene
construction. (b) Future thinking to navigation, mediated by autobiograph-
ical memory. The numbers in brackets show the effect of the independent
variable on the dependent when the mediation variable was also taken into
consideration.  p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001. See the online article for
the color version of this figure.
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porate event details of episodic memories and future events, or
route details when navigating, allowing them to be played out in a
coherent and naturalistic manner (Maguire & Mullally, 2013; see
also Clark & Maguire, 2016).
Revealing the influence of scene construction over autobio-
graphical memory may seem to be in contrast to the decades of
work that has strongly associated the hippocampus and autobio-
graphical memory (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007; Squire, 1992;
Svoboda et al., 2006). We do not deny or diminish this relation-
ship. However, in addition to autobiographical memory, scene
construction and thinking about the future have also been associ-
ated with the hippocampus (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, et al.,
2007; Schacter et al., 2012), and there are substantial overlaps in
the behavioral correlates of autobiographical memory, scene con-
struction and future thinking (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden,
2004; de Vito et al., 2012; Robin & Moscovitch, 2014). We
suggest that our results allow us to start specifying more precisely
why these similar, but different, cognitive processes are associated
with the hippocampus. In short, our findings point toward scene
construction being a common process underlying autobiographical
memory and future thinking (Maguire & Mullally, 2013; Zeidman
& Maguire, 2016) rather than autobiographical memory being the
common component (Addis et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2012).
It is interesting to note that the PCA loaded navigation with
spatial tasks, and not with scene construction, autobiographical
memory, and future thinking. Navigation also had the smallest
effect sizes in terms of the regressions among the primary tasks of
interest. Why this is the case will be an interesting topic for future
work. For now, we have two speculations. First, imagery comes in
multiple forms. A popular distinction is between analytical imag-
Figure 8. Sensitivity analyses for the indirect and direct effects of the mediation analyses of the future thinking
to navigation relationship with scene construction or autobiographical memory as the mediating variable. (a)
Sensitivity of the indirect effect of scene construction on the relationship between future thinking and navigation.
(b) Sensitivity of the direct effect between future thinking and navigation, when scene construction was taken
into consideration. (c) Sensitivity of the indirect effect of autobiographical memory on the relationship between
future thinking and navigation. (d) Sensitivity of the direct effect between future thinking and navigation, when
autobiographical memory was taken into consideration. The dashed line shows the average effect when
additional error is assumed to be 0. The plotted line shows the variation in the effect when the additional error
is varied between 1 and 1 (with 95% confidence intervals). The more robust the effect, the greater the variance
that was required to reduce the effect to 0 (i.e., to cross the x-axis).
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ery, reliant upon schematic images, compared to vivid and colorful
images of specific scenes and objects (e.g., Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn,
& Shephard, 2005). It could be argued that navigation is more like
the former, whereas scene construction, autobiographical memory,
and future thinking are more similar to the latter. A detailed
analysis of the types of imagery being used to perform these tasks
may be useful in exploring this further. Second, the distinction
between navigation and the other tasks may be because they rely
on different hippocampal subregions. Navigation is typically as-
sociated with the posterior hippocampus (Maguire et al., 2000),
whereas scene construction, autobiographical memory, and future
thinking are more often associated with the anterior hippocampus
(Dalton & Maguire, 2017; Maguire & Mullally, 2013; Zeidman &
Maguire, 2016). Understanding the specialization of different re-
gions of the hippocampus will also be an important topic for future
work.
Although the reduced associations with navigation advocate
caution in making generalizations from navigation studies to, for
example, autobiographical memory, we nevertheless still found
that scene construction partially mediated the relationship between
the spatial tasks and navigation. Thus, even with navigation being
more strongly associated with spatial tasks, the involvement of
scene processing remained prominent, whereas, importantly, nei-
ther autobiographical memory nor future thinking mediated this
relationship.
Here, our main interest was in scene construction, autobiograph-
ical memory, future thinking, and navigation. As such, the numer-
ous other tasks that were included in the initial PCA are not
reported on in detail. However, we make several brief observations
in relation to these tests. It is notable that recall and recognition
tasks loaded onto separate components, as did episodic and se-
mantic memory tasks. There is still debate in the literature about
whether all of these tasks are hippocampal-dependent (Smith et al.,
2014; Squire, 1992) or whether only recall and episodic memory
tasks require the hippocampus (Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, & Ran-
ganath, 2007). Although we do not assess this in detail, our
findings are more concordant with this latter perspective.
It is also the case that the recall tasks loaded onto components
that were different from the scene component onto which our
primary tasks of interest loaded. If the hippocampus is involved in
supporting memory recall tasks and also scene construction, auto-
biographical memory and future thinking, why did they all not
cluster onto one factor? The data suggest that the standardized
tests, in particular, clustered according to the modality in which a
test was presented. That is, all the verbal recall tasks loaded
together, and the visual recall tasks loaded on the spatial compo-
nent. This does not mean that these tasks are unrelated to our
primary tasks of interest, but rather that modality exerted a signif-
icant influence.
One question that is often asked of the scene construction
theory, is why does hippocampal damage result in verbal memory
deficits, for example, in word paired associates tasks, if visuospa-
tial scenes are of particular relevance for hippocampal function?
We have previously suggested that some verbal tasks may in fact
engage scene imagery (e.g., imagining the two objects in a word
pair together in a scene; Clark & Maguire, 2016; Maguire &
Mullally, 2013), and that this could explain their dependence on
the hippocampus. Recent work using functional neuroimaging
lends credence to this idea by finding that high imagery concrete
word pairs evoked hippocampal activity due to the use of scene
imagery, whereas low imagery abstract word pairs did not (Clark
et al., 2018). Another way to test this in the future would be to
interrogate the explicit strategies that people use to perform dif-
ferent verbal recall tasks. This would enable us to ascertain if scene
imagery is involved more generally in verbal tasks, and indeed
whether the use of such imagery confers a performance advantage.
We note that the scene component of the PCA contained tasks
that were scored from open ended verbal descriptions. As such,
verbal task demands—be that narrative style, verbal ability, and so
forth—or similarities in scoring across the tasks could be candi-
Figure 9. Structural equation model of the spatial component to navigation relationship mediated by the scene
component. The darker arrows show the main paths of interest, the lighter arrows show the links between the
individual observed variables and their related latent variable. The R2 values represent the proportion of variance
explained by the main paths of interest (i.e., the dark arrows). Numerical values linked with a pathway represent
unstandardized path coefficients.  p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001. See the online article for the color version
of this figure.
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date processes linking scene construction, autobiographical mem-
ory and future thinking. However, if this was the case, we would
have expected a different pattern of results to emerge. First,
autobiographical memory external details should have loaded onto
the scene component, and it did not. Second, the loading of the
scene description task should have been stronger, more in line with
the loadings of scene construction, future thinking and autobio-
graphical memory, but it was not. Finally, future thinking should
have mediated the relationship between autobiographical memory
and scene construction and the relationship between the spatial
component and navigation, and yet it did not. Instead, we observed
that external details loaded onto the semantic memory component,
that the scene description task loaded most strongly on the per-
ception component and that there was only a mediating effect of
scene construction.
In addition, to further examine the potential involvement of
verbal processing, we also ran a series of control mediation anal-
yses looking at the effects of the verbal memory component (as a
proxy for verbal ability) on the tasks of the scene component (see
Supplemental Figure S2 in the online supplementary materials).
We found that the influence of the verbal memory component was
either fully or partially mediated in all the models. This suggests
that the relationships between scene construction, autobiographical
memory and future thinking we reported above cannot simply be
explained by verbal ability.
A related potential criticism is that we tested the influence of
memory on the relationship between scene construction, autobio-
graphical memory and future thinking using a memory task that
relied on verbal output. To address this issue, we also examined
the relationships between scene construction, autobiographical
memory and future thinking with a nonverbal memory task (the
delayed recall of the ROCF) as the mediator and found no influ-
ence on any of the relationships (see Supplemental Tables S15 and
S16 in the online supplementary materials). This lends further
support to the idea that scene imagery rather than memory may be
a key feature underlying the relationships between scene construc-
tion, autobiographical memory, and future thinking.
Finally, we also observed the surprising finding in the PCA
analysis that the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test, Matrix Rea-
soning, and the Symbol Span test loaded most strongly on the
Figure 10. Structural equation models of the spatial component to navigation relationship mediated by scene
construction, autobiographical memory or future thinking. The darker arrows show the main paths of interest,
the lighter arrows show the links between the individual observed variables and the latent variable (spatial). The
R2 values represent the proportion of variance explained by the main paths of interest (i.e., the dark arrows).
Numerical values linked with a pathway represent unstandardized path coefficients.  p  .05.  p  .01.
 p  .001. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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spatial component. This was unexpected because these tasks are
typically thought to tax executive functioning and general intel-
lectual ability (e.g., Wechsler, 2008, 2009). Studies using these
standardized tasks should perhaps bear this in mind, as our data
suggest that individual differences in spatial processing could
affect performance on these tasks.
Here we have alluded to the function of the hippocampus
without measuring the hippocampus itself. We feel confident in
doing so because of the many previous findings associating the
hippocampus with scene construction, autobiographical memory,
future thinking and navigation. Moreover, the issue of central
interest here—to understand the cognitive processes involved in
these tasks—is not reliant upon direct hippocampal measurement.
However, an important next step will undoubtedly be to directly
relate the process of scene construction with structural and func-
tional measurements of the hippocampus.
We also acknowledge that scene construction, autobiographical
memory, future thinking, and navigation have each been associ-
ated with brain regions outside of the hippocampus including (but
not limited to) parahippocampal, retrosplenial, posterior cingulate,
parietal, and medial prefrontal cortices (e.g., Hassabis, Kumaran,
& Maguire, 2007; Schacter et al., 2012; Stawarczyk &
D’Argembeau, 2015). For example, lesions to the parietal cortex
impair the subjective experience associated with autobiographical
memory (Ciaramelli et al., 2017; Simons, Peers, Mazuz, Berryhill,
& Olson, 2010) and posterior parietal damage has been linked to
a reduction in scene construction ability (Ramanan et al., 2018). A
variety of extrahippocampal brain regions have been implicated in
supporting navigation, and a reliance upon nonhippocampal re-
gions for navigation has been suggested to increase with age
(Moffat, Elkins, & Resnick, 2006; Zhong & Moffat, 2018). An
important future step will, therefore, be to understand the interac-
tions, both structural and functional, between the hippocampus and
these other regions, and their relationships with individual differ-
ences in task performance.
We also note that it is unlikely the hippocampus supports only
one fundamental process. A number of studies have associated
different hippocampal subregions with distinct cognitive processes
(e.g., Dalton, Zeidman, McCormick, & Maguire, 2018; Dimsdale-
Zucker, Ritchey, Ekstrom, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2018;
Hodgetts et al., 2017; Zeidman, Lutti, & Maguire, 2015). The
results from the current study suggest that the construction of
scene imagery seems to play an influential role in autobiographical
memory, future thinking and, to some extent, navigation, and
consequently, scene construction may be at least one process
performed by the hippocampus.
In conclusion, we are not alone in suggesting that the hippocam-
pus is more than just a memory device (O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978;
Shohamy & Turk-Browne, 2013; Tulving, 2002; Verfaellie &
Keane, 2017). However, here, a large sample of participants,
numerous cognitive tests, and a wide variance in performance
enabled us to provide novel evidence regarding the interrelations
between tasks that have hitherto not been systematically examined.
We found that the construction of scene imagery plays a particu-
larly prominent role in several hippocampal-dependent tasks. This
finding lays the groundwork for future studies that should directly
examine the strategies and types of imagery people use to perform
such tasks, and how this is realized by the hippocampus and its
specific subregions.
Context
The current study is part of a body of work investigating the
relationships between a diversity of tasks that have individually
been associated with a brain structure called the hippocampus,
located deep in the brain’s temporal lobes. There is debate about
the hippocampus’ contribution to these tasks which, on face value,
appear to be distinct. Here, we highlight the importance of visual
scene imagery for three tasks typically associated with the hip-
pocampus—autobiographical memory, future thinking, and spatial
navigation. Future work aims to build on these findings by con-
ducting a detailed analysis of the explicit strategies deployed by
participants to perform these tasks and whether scene imagery
plays a role, and by examining how variations in task performance
may be related to structural and functional measurements of the
brain, including the hippocampus.
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